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JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1988) .
This is an appeal from an Order entered by the Honorable
George E. Ballif, Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County,
State of Utah, on April 6, 1988, granting defendants1 Motion for
Summary Judgment and denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Utah Code Annotated § 75-6-112 (1975) bars

plaintiff's recovery for Zions' failure to pay him under joint
Certificates of Deposit, which were instead reissued at the
direction of the owner of the Certificates of Deposit.
2.

Whether the testimony of one bank teller, in

contravention of the testimony of all the other witnesses in the
case, including the plaintiff, and which if believed still
requires that the plaintiff fail to recover against Zions,
constitutes a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to
preclude the granting of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a legal malpractice action.

Plaintiff Garth Youd

("Youd") retained defendants to pursue an action against Zions
First National Bank ("Zions") to recover amounts Youd claimed due
him under two Certificates of Deposit.

Judgment was entered in

favor of Zions and against Youd, and Youd then initiated this
action against defendants.

Defendants admitted negligence, and the issues involved
in this action were limited to questions of causation and damages
—

whether defendants' negligence harmed the plaintiff.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in this

action based upon the statutory protection Zions enjoyed against
the very claim the plaintiff asserted —

claims of improper

payment on multiple-party Certificates of Deposit.

Plaintiff

responded by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment.
motions were argued at the pre-trial conference.

These

Judge Ballif

denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Defendants were retained by plaintiff to represent

him in an action against Zions First National Bank ("Zions").
Complaint at If 4, R. 1.
2.

In connection with defendants' representation of

plaintiff, defendants filed an action entitled Garth Youd v. Zions
First National Bank, Civ. No. C83-1368-W, in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah (the "Zions action").
3.

Defendant Richard B. Johnson failed to appear at a

pre-trial conference in the Zions action, and failed to file an
appellate brief in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit on the appeal of the Zions action.
4.

R. 112-114.

Zions issued two Certificates of Deposit in the joint

names of Wilford Youd and Garth Youd in the amounts of $10,000.00
-2-

and $15,000.00.

Complaint in Zions Action at 1f 5, R. 50.

The

$10,000.00 Certificate matured on September 6, 1982 and the
$15,000.00 Certificate matured on October 27, 1982.
5.

R. 177.

On September 7, 1982, plaintiff took the two

Certificates of Deposit to the Zions Spanish Fork Branch and spoke
with Dona Jensen and Irene K. Brunson, two employees of the Zion's
Spanish Fork Branch.

Plaintiff requested that they recover the

interest that had been paid to plaintiff's sister on the
$10,000.00 Certificate of Deposit, roll the interest into the
principal, and issue a new Certificate of Deposit for the
principal and interest amount in plaintiff's name only.

Once this

was done, they were to place the new Certificate of Deposit and
the $15,000.00 Certificate of Deposit into plaintiff's safety
deposit box.

Plaintiff was going to mail the key to the safety

deposit box so that this could be accomplished.

Garth Youd

Deposition at pp. 70-75 and 81, R. 62-68.
6.

Plaintiff's request was not in writing.

Garth Youd

Deposition at pp. 75 and 81, R. 67-68.
7.

On September 7, 1982, Richard B. Roach, Manager of

Zion's Spanish Fork Branch, spoke with Dona Jensen and Irene K.
Brunson regarding plaintiff's request.

Richard B. Roach

Deposition at pp. 36-44, R. 71-79.
8.

On September 7, 1982, Richard B. Roach met with Leona

Warner, daughter of Wilford Youd, who informed him that Wilford
was concerned about his money, that the family was concerned about
medical expenses Wilford might incur, and that it was not the time
-3-

to be dividing up money among children.

Roach Deposition at

pp. 38-40, R. 73-75.
9.

On September 7, 1982, Wilford Youd directed

Richard B. Roach to have the Certificates of Deposit taken out of
Wilford and Garth's names and placed in the names of Wilford and
his two daughters, Leona Warner and LaRaine Mackley.

Roach

Deposition at pp. 42-44, R. 77-79.
10.
request.

Richard Roach complied with

Wilford Youd's

Roach Deposition at p. 44, R. 79.
11.

Garth Youd did not pay anything for the Certificates

of Deposit involved in this action.

Youd Deposition at p. 57,

R. 149.
12.

Dona Jensen testified that on two occasions she

reissued Certificates in the name of Garth Youd and returned the
new Certificates to Youd before he left the bank.

Dona Jensen

Deposition at pp. 14-17, R. 137-140.
13.

Zions First National Bank has a practice and

procedure of reissuing Certificates of Deposit, including changing
the names on the Certificate, without endorsement.

Roach

Deposition at p. 47, R. 151.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In order to prevail in an action for legal malpractice,
the plaintiff must establish all elements of the cause of action.
Failure to prove causation or damages bars recovery despite an
admission of negligence on the part of the defendants.
-4-

Youd is

barred by law from recovering against Zions and therefore has no
damages, so summary judgment in defendants' favor is proper.
The $15,000.00 Certificate of Deposit was not mature, was
not presented for payment, and could not be paid to Youd on
September 7, 1982. The fact that the owner of the Certificate,
Wilford Youd, later chose to have the Certificate reissued without
Garth Youd•s name on it does not give rise to a cause of action by
Garth Youd against Zions. Youd could not recover under any theory
with respect to the $15,000 Certificate.

The issues in this case

are properly limited to the disposition of the $10,000.00
Certificate.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-112 provides an absolute discharge
of any claims Youd could assert against Zions concerning the
disposition of the $10,000.00 Certificate.

Zions received

instructions from both named beneficiaries, and chose to honor the
Certificate's owner's instructions.

This section discharges Zions

from any liability for making that decision.
Similarly, there is no genuine issue of material fact
concerning the reissuance of the $10,000.00 Certificate.

Youd now

attempts to create an issue of fact by relying upon the testimony
of a Zions' employee who claimed that she had reissued a
certificate in Youd's name and given it back to him before he left
the bank.

It is not clear that this testimony refers to the

Certificate involved in this case.

If it does, it is contradicted

by Youd's own testimony as well as by the testimony of the other
Zions' employees.

Even assuming as we must that the employee's
-5-

testimony is true, Zions would still be entitled to summary
judgment because Youd would have had the $10,000.00 Certificate in
his possession and issued in his name alone, and no claim that
Zions had not followed his directions could arise.

The trial

judge properly found that there was no genuine issue of material
fact concerning this issue.
Plaintiff's reliance on the presentment provisions of the
U.C.C. and those contained in the Certificates of Deposit is also
misplaced.

As noted above, the $15,000.00 Certificate was not

mature and not eligible for payment or presentment at the time
Youd was in the bank.

The $10,000.00 Certificate was mature, but

Youd did not request present payment.

Rather, he instructed the

bank to recover the interest it had paid on the Certificate to
Youd's sisters and to issue a new Certificate in his name alone
for the current principal plus the interest recovered.

Since

there was no presentment for payment, the U.C.C. provisions upon
which plaintiff relies are not applicable, nor are the provisions
of the Certificate of Deposit quoted by plaintiff.
Plaintiff's claim that Zions violated a bailment he
created concerning the Certificates of Deposit is without merit.
The duty of a bailee also runs to the true owner of the property.
It is undisputed that under Utah law, Youd's father, Wilford Youd,
was the owner of both Certificates of Deposit.

Zions' actions of

which plaintiff complains were merely to carry out the wishes of
Youd's father, Wilford Youd, in reissuing the Certificates in the
name of Wilford Youd and the plaintiff's sisters, Leona Warner and
-6-

LaRaine Mackey.

Zions had no duty running to the plaintiff which

superceded its duty owed to the owner, Wilford Youd.
Zions* actions do not subject it to liability to the
plaintiff.

Accordingly, Zions would have prevailed in the

original federal district court action and defendants' negligence
in representing the plaintiff did not cause plaintiff any damage.
For these reasons, the Court's ruling of summary judgment in favor
of the defendants is proper and should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF MUST ESTABLISH ALL ELEMENTS OF A LEGAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIM TO PREVAIL.
The plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must prove

each and every one of the following elements in order to establish
the cause of action:
1.

That an attorney-client relationship existed;

2.

That the attorney had a duty to the client;

3.

That the attorney failed to perform the duty;

4.

That the client suffered damages; and

5.

That the attorney's negligence proximately caused

the damage to the client.
Stanqland v. Brock, 109 Wash.2d 675, 747 P.2d 464 (1987); Phillips
v. Clancey, 152 Ariz. 415, 733 P.2d 300 (Ct. App. 1986); Chocktoot
v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, 571 P.2d 1255 (1977); R. Mallen and
V. Levit, Legal Malpractice, § 657 (2d Ed. 1981) (hereinafter
referred to as "Legal Malpractice").

-7-

In a case such as this, where the alleged error is an
omission, the test of causation is:

Had the attorney performed

the act, would the plaintiff have benefited?

Dunn v. McKay,

Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 895 (Utah 1978)
(appropriate to inquire as to what the plaintiffs position would
have been if the attorney had performed the act properly); see
also Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P.2d 686, 689 (1968);
Legal Malpractice, § 102.
within a suit."

This inquiry is referred to as "a suit

Chocktoot v. Smith, 571 P.2d at 1257.

In this case, there is no dispute concerning the
existence of the attorney-client relationship and defendants have
admitted that they were negligent in representing the plaintiff in
the underlying action.

Therefore, the plaintiff must establish

the final elements of damages and causation in order to recover in
this case.

These elements are established by examining the "suit

within a suit" and what would have hapened if the federal district
court action had been decided on the merits.
The manner in which the plaintiff can establish what
should have transpired in the underlying action necessarily
depends upon the nature of the attorney's error.

If the action

never took place, as where it was barred by a statute of
limitations or concluded by a default judgment, as in this case,
the plaintiff will be required to recreate, i.e., litigate, an
action which was never tried.

Legal Malpractice § 656.

Recreating the underlying action involves
calling and examining those persons who would
have been parties and witnesses and presenting
-8-

the demonstrative and documentary evidence which
would have been presented but for the attorney's
negligence. This procedure of presenting the
evidence which should have been offered at the
trial of the underlying action is known as a
•suit within a suit* or 'trial within a trial.'
This is the accepted and traditional means of
resolving issues involved in the underlying
proceedings in a legal malpractice action.
Id.

See Kessler v. Gray, 77 Cal. App. 3d 284, 143 Cal. Rptr. 496

(Ct. App. 1978); Michael Kovach, P.A. v. Pearce, 427 So. 2d 1128,
1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), pet, den., 434 So. 2d 888 (Fla.
1983); Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super. 290, 319 A.2d 781,
785 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974); Lewandowski v. Continental
Casualty Co., 88 Wis. 2d 271, 276 N.W. 2d 284, 289 (1979).

In

other words, the client must show that he would have won the first
suit as one step in order to win the second one.

Harding v. Bell,

265 Or. 202, 508 P.2d 216, 217 (1973).
II.

PLAINTIFF CAN OBTAIN NO RECOVERY AGAINST ZIONS AS A MATTER OF
LAW, AND THEREFORE, PLAINTIFF IS UNABLE TO ESTABLISH EITHER
CAUSATION OR DAMAGES.
In the Zions action, plaintiff claimed that he and his

father, Wilford Youd, were the named payees of two Certificates of
Deposit issued by Zions in the amount of $15,000.00 and $10,000.00,
respectively.

Plaintiff testified that on September 7, 1982, he

took the two Certificates of Deposit to Zions' Spanish Fork Branch
and instructed Zions to recover the interest on the $10,000.00
Certificate of Deposit, roll the interest into the principal, and
issue a new Certificate of Deposit in the plaintiff's name.
Zions was to place the new Certificate of Deposit and the

-9-

Then

(unmatured) $15,000.00 Certificate of Deposit into plaintiff's
safety deposit box.
R. 62-67.

Garth Youd Deposition at pp. 70-75/

Plaintiff claimed in the Zions action that Zions failed

to follow his instructions and acted wrongfully in reissuing the
Certificates of Deposit in the names of his father and his two
sisters.
Zions had an absolute defense to the claims asserted by
plaintiff in the Zions action.
A.

The Certificates of Deposit Were "Multiple-Party
Accounts" Under Utah Law.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-101(1) defines "account" as follows:
"Account" means a contract of deposit of funds
between a depositor and a financial institution and
includes a checking account, savings account,
certificate of deposit, share account and other
like arrangement.

(Emphasis supplied.)
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-101(4) defines "joint account" as
follows:
"Joint account" means an account payable on
request to one or more of two or more parties
whether or not mention is made of any right of
survivorship.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-101(5) defines "multiple-party
account" to include joint accounts as defined under § 75-6-101(4).
Under the terms of § 75-6-101(1), (4) and (5), the
Certificates of Deposit issued by Zions to plaintiff and his
father were multiple-party accounts.

-10-

B.

Zions' Conduct Discharges It from Liability for
Plaintiff's Claim in the Zions Action.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-108 provides:
Financial institutions may enter into
multiple-party accounts to the same extent that
they may enter into single-party accounts. Any
multiple-party account may be paid, on request of
any one or more of the parties. A financial
institution shall not be required to inquire as to
the source of funds received for deposit to a
multiple-party account or to inquire as to the
proposed application of any sum withdrawn from an
account, for purposes of establishing net
contributions.

(Emphasis supplied.)
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-112 provides in pertinent part:
Payment made pursuant to Section 75-6-108
. . . discharges the financial institution from
all claims for amounts so paid whether or not the
payment is consistent with the beneficial
ownership of the account as between parties
. . . . The protection here given does not extend
to payments made after a financial institution has
received written notice from any party able to
request present payment to the effect that
withdrawals in accordance with the terms of the
account should not be permitted. Unless the
notice is withdrawn by the person giving it, the
successor of any deceased party must concur in any
demand for withdrawal if the financial institution
is to be protected under this section. No other
notice or any other information shown to have been
available to a financial institution shall affect
its right to the protection provided here. The
protection here provided shall have no bearing on
the rights of parties in disputes between
themselves or their successors concerning the
beneficial ownership of funds in, or withdrawn
from, multiple party accounts.
(Emphasis supplied.)

-11-

Only one Utah case has discussed the aforementioned
statutory provisions.

In Smith v. Utah Central Credit Union, 727

P.2d 219 (Utah 1986), the plaintiff brought an action to recover
funds deposited to a joint savings account and withdrawn by his
wife.

The plaintiff alleged that the credit union failed to honor

his telephone request that no money be withdrawn by his wife
without his approval.
plaintiff.

The trial court entered judgment against

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court cited the provisions

of Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-6-108 and 75-6-112 and affirmed the
judgment against the plaintiff, relieving the credit union of
liability and stating that the plaintiffs oral statements to the
credit union were not "written notice" under § 75-6-112.

Here

plaintiff complains that his oral instructions to Zions were not
followed, and that Zions' reissuance of the Certificates at
Wilford Youd's request entitles him to recovery.

Just as in

Smith, the financial institution's actions should be protected and
j udgment af f i rmed.
In plaintiff's deposition taken in the Zions action,
plaintiff admitted that his instructions to Zions were oral.
Garth Youd deposition at pp. 72-75, R. 64-67.

Therefore, there is

no possible way the exception in § 75-6-112 concerning receipt of
written notice from any party "able to request present payment"
applies.

No written notice was given, and Youd's own testimony

shows that in any event his instructions were not to refuse
"withdrawals in accordance with the terms of the account," and so
would not trigger the exception.
-12-

In the Zions action, Richard B. Roach, Branch Manager of
Zions, testified that on September 7, 1982, he had a conversation
with Dona Jensen and Irene K. Brunson, two employees of Zions, who
informed him of plaintiff's requests.

He further testified, that

on that same day, he was contacted by Leona Warner, the daughter
of Wilford Youd, who told him that the family was concerned about
medical expenses Wilford Youd might incur later in life and that
that was not the time to be dividing his money among the children.
She also told him that Wilford Youd was concerned about what was
happening with his money.
Youd call him.

Mr. Roach asked Leona to have Wilford

On September 7, Wilford Youd telephoned Mr. Roach

who told him about Garth's request.

In response, Wilford Youd

told Mr. Roach to take Garth's name off of the Certificates of
Deposit, and to have the Certificates of Deposit reissued in
Wilford Youd's name and the names of his two daughters.
Roach Deposition at pp. 36-45, R. 71-80.

Richard

Zions complied with the

request of Wilford Youd, and reissued the Certificates of Deposit
in his name and the names of his two daughters.
Under § 75-6-108, Zions had the right to follow the
instructions of Wilford Youd.

Section 75-6-112 discharges Zions

from all of plaintiff's claims for following the request of
Wilford Youd.
C.

Wilford Youd's Request for Reissuance of the Certificate
of Deposit was a "Proper Request".
Plaintiff argues that Wilford Youd's telephone

instructions to Richard Roach do not constitute a "request" as
-13-

defined in Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-101(12), and so Zions cannot
enjoy the protection of § 75-6-112.

Appellant's Brief at 29-31.

Section 75-6-101(12) defines a request to be:
A proper request for withdrawal, or a check or
order for payment, which complies with all
conditions of the account, including special
requirements concerning necessary signatures and
regulations of the financial institution . . . .
Wilford Youd requested Zions to reissue the two Certificates of
Deposit in his name and the names of his two daughters.
Deposition, pp. 42-44, R. 77-79.
request.

Roach

Zions complied with that

The Certificates of Deposit do not specify any

conditions for their reissuance, and plaintiff has failed to
establish that any conditions for reissuance exist under the terms
of the Certificates, or under any laws or regulations concerning
financial institutions.

Zions had a practice and procedure

permitting a party to a joint account to orally request the change
of the names on the account, without endorsement.
Deposition, pp. 47-48, R. 151-152.

Roach

Zions followed Wilford Youd*s

request based on this policy and procedure.

Id..

Therefore,

Wilford Youd's request met all the "conditions of the account" as
required by § 75-6-101(12) and was a proper request, entitling
Zions to the protection of § 75-6-112.
Section 75-6-112 protects a financial institution from
claims for not dividing up the proceeds of a joint account
according to its beneficial ownership.

Here Zions was faced with

conflicting claims by each named payee.
its hands and paid the money into court.
-14-

It could have thrown up
The court then would

have looked to who provided the funds, i.e., who was the owner of
the account pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-103(1), and decided
in favor of the owner, Wilford Youd.

Zions should not and cannot

be held liable for coming to the same conclusion a court would
have.
III.

THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT CONCERNING THE
REISSUANCE OF THE $10,000.00 CERTIFICATE.
In plaintiff's Appeal Brief he claims that the district

court erred in not finding that there was a genuine issue of
material fact concerning the alleged reissuance of the $10,000.00
Certificate in his name alone.

It is interesting to note that

while the plaintiff did mention the testimony which supports this
claim below, he argued instead for summary judgment in his favor
and that there were no genuine issues of material fact.
Plaintiff's claim that there is a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the $10,000.00 Certificate was reissued in his name
alone is based upon the testimony of Dona Jensen.
Dona Jensen at pp. 14-17, R. 137-140.

Deposition of

Her testimony was that on

two separate occasions Youd came into the bank with a certificate
of deposit of $10,000.00 or more and requested that the interest
be added to the principal and a new certificate be issued in his
name alone.

Jensen testified that on both occasions she reissued

the new certificate, handed it to Youd, who then left the bank.
She also testified that sometime after these two certificates had
been reissued, she was advised by Richard Roach, the branch
manager, that he had talked to Wilford Youd and that a problem had
-15-

come up about some Certificates of Deposit.
pp. 22-24.

Jensen Depo.

There is nothing to connect the certificates she

discusses with those involved in this action.

According to the

testimony of all the other players involved, including the
plaintiff, he brought both Certificates in on the same day, only
one of which was mature and able to be cashed.

He left the

Certificates with Zions with instructions to recover the interest
on the $10,000.00 Certificate and only then reissue it in a new
amount, including the interest, in his name alone.

Later that

same day, the bank was contacted by Wilford Youd and given
different instructions.
Plaintiff's attempt to create an issue of fact is a red
herring.

If Ms. Jensen's testimony refers to these Certificates

of Deposit and is correct, then Youd left the bank with reissued
Certificates of Deposit in his name alone.

If this is the case,

the Zions action would never have been filed since he had the
Certificates to do with as he pleased.

Zions could not have

reissued the Certificates again after they had been given to
Youd.

Ms. Jensen's testimony is not at all specific as to the

date these events occurred, except that it was prior to her
conversation with Richard Roach concerning his conversation with
Wilford Youd.

When asked what Roach told her to do concerning the

Certificates of Deposit, Jensen testified that as to the
certificates she had reissued, "they were over and done with," and
that there were "apparently other certificates."
Deposition at pp. 23-24.
-16-

Jensen

This does not create a genuine issue of material fact.
If Jensen's testimony is accurate and actually refers to the
Certificates of Deposit involved in this case, which is nowhere
indicated in her testimony, this action would not exist.

If the

testimony refers to other certificates of deposit she reissued for
plaintiff, her testimony is of no relevance to Zions actions with
respect to these two Certificates of Deposit.

Plaintiffs

testimony regarding what he did with the two Certificates involved
in this action was that he spoke to Dona Jensen and Irene Bronson,
but that he talked Irene and gave her (not Dona) instructions
concerning what to do with the Certificates of Deposit. Youd's
Deposition at pp. 72-74, R. 125-127.
The trial court properly concluded that Ms. Jensen's
testimony concerning reissuing new certificates of deposit and
delivering them to Garth Youd did not raise a genuine issue of
material fact in this case.

If Ms. Jensen's testimony is correct,

Youd received a reissued Certificate of Deposit and Zions did not
act improperly; plaintiff has no claim.

If her testimony is not

correct, Zions is protected by Utah law in its decision to honor
the wishes of the owner of the Certificates of Deposit, and is not
liable to the plaintiff.

Either way, summary judgment in favor of

the defendants is appropriate.

As Professor Moore states, "[t]he

function of the summary judgment is to avoid a useless
trial. . . . "
1988).

6 Moore's Federal Practice If 56.15 [1.-0] (2d Ed.

A trial over this issue (the only issue plaintiff even

attempts to argue is disputed) would indeed be useless — no
-17-

matter the decision regarding Ms. Jensen's testimony, plaintiff
cannot recover against Zions.
To successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, a
party's facts "must be material and of a substantial nature, not
fanciful, frivolous, gauzy, spurious, irrelevant, gossamer inferences, conjectural, speculative, nor merely suspicions."
Federal Practice 1f 56.15 [3] (2d Ed. 1988).

6 Moore's

While defendants

hesitate to categorize plaintiff's alleged issue of fact, its
determination is of no influence on the outcome of this action and
should not be considered a genuine issue of material fact.
IV.

NO PRESENTMENT WAS MADE AND THEREFORE THE U.C.C. PROVISIONS
AND TERMS OF THE CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT CONCERNING
PRESENTMENT DO NOT APPLY.
It is undisputed that the $15,000.00 Certificate was not

mature on September 7, 1982, and therefore, Youd could not have
presented it for payment.

Similarly, Zions cannot be liable for

dishonor of presentment for that Certificate.

It is also

undisputed that Youd did not present the $10,000.00 Certificate
for present payment.

Rather, as he testified, he requested that

the bank recover the interest paid on the Certificate, add the
amount of interest to the principal, and reissue a new certificate
in his name alone.

Youd Deposition at pp. 72-77, R. 125-129.

Since plaintiff did not request present payment of the
Certificates, the U.C.C. provisions and provisions of the
Certificate relied upon by the plaintiff are not relevant or
dispositive in this case.

-18-

It is clear under the U.C.C. that presentment requires a
demand for present payment.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-504(1).

For

example, in Bank of Miami v. Banco Industrial Y Ganadero Del Beni,
S.A., 515 So. 2d 1038, 1040, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1522 (Fla.
App. 1987), review dismissed, 520 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1988), the
court held that submitting a check for collection (i.e., payable
if and when sufficient funds are deposited in the drawer's account
to cover the amount of the check, is not "presentment" within the
meaning of § 3-504, because it is not a "present demand for
payment."

See also, Western Air & Refrigeration, Inc. v. Metro

Bank, 599 F.2d 83, 88 (5th Cir. 1979) (check presented for
collection is not presentment); Iverson v. First Bank of Billings,
712 P.2d 1285 (Mont. 1985) (check sent to payor bank for payment
once funds become available to pay it not presented under § 3-504).
In this case plaintiff never made a demand for present
payment.

Rather, he requested that Zions hold the Certificate

until it recovered the interest it had paid on it and then issue a
new Certificate in his name alone for the new total, including
both the old principal and the interest.

This type of arrangement

is not a present demand for payment and not a presentment within
the meaning of § 70A-3-504.

Without presentment, plaintiff's

arguments concerning Zions' refusal to make payment, appellant's
Brief at pp. 24-29, are not relevant to this case.
The only question is whether there are any provisions of
law or contractual provisions which permit names on joint accounts
to be changed by one of the payees.
-19-

No such law or contractual

provisions have been presented by the plaintiff or located by the
defendants.

In this case, Zions received conflicting instructions

on the same day from both named payees.

It chose to follow the

instructions given by Wilford Youd, the owner of the
Certificates.1
Since plaintiff did not present the Certificates for
present payment, Zions could not have and is not liable for
dishonored presentment of the Certificates.
V.

ZIONS IS NOT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF AS A BAILEE.
There is no evidence that in receiving the two Certifi-

cates from Garth Youd, Zions agreed to follow his instructions. As
a result, there is nothing to indicate the acceptance of a
bailment by Zions.

However, even if we assume that a bailor-

bailee relationship existed between Garth Youd and Zions, Zions
would not have been liable to Garth Youd.
It is generally accepted that delivery of property
subject to a bailment to the true owner, in good faith, is a valid
defense to an action brought by the bailor against the bailee.
See 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Bailments, §§ 194-197.

It is also recognized

that the bailee's obligations run to the paramount titleholder as

2

Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-103(1) provides that a joint account belongs,
during the lifetime of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net
contributions by each to the sums on deposit, unless there is clear and
convincing evidence of a different intent. In this case, it is undisputed that
all of the funds for both Certificates of Deposit were provided by Wilford Youd.
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well as to the bailor.

See, Christensen v. Hoover, 44 Colo. App.

501, 608 P.2d 372, 374, (1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 643 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1982).
As set forth above, § 75-6-103(1) provides that as
between the parties on joint accounts, the account belongs to the
parties in proportion to their contributions.

In the Zions

action, Wilford Youd was the owner of the Certificates by
application of § 75-6-103(1).

It is undisputed that Zions

understood the ownership rights to the Certificates consistently
with the provisions of § 75-6-103(1), and based on that
understanding followed the instructions of Wilford Youd.
Roach Depo. pp. 44-45, R. 79-80.

Richard

In following the instructions of

the owner, Wilford Youd, Zions incurs no liability to Garth Youd.
Zions cannot be liable to plaintiff for conversion since
it did not retain the Certificates or obtain any benefit from
them, but rather disposed of them in accordance with the wishes of
the true owner of the Certificates, Wilford Youd.
VI.

IN NO EVENT CAN PLAINTIFF RECOVER CONCERNING THE $15,000.00
CERTIFICATE.
It is undisputed that the $15,000.00 Certificate was not

mature at the time Youd brought the Certificates to the bank.

He

could not present it for payment, nor could he request payment, or
even provide written notice as a "party able to request present
payment" pursuant to § 76-5-112.

Therefore, under none of the

theories advanced by the plaintiff could Zions have become liable
for its actions concerning the $15,000.00 Certificate or its
-21-

reissuance of that Certificate in the names of Wilford Youd and the
plaintiff's sisters.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff must establish that he was damaged and that his
damage was caused by the defendants' negligence.

In this case,

plaintiff did not suffer any damage caused by the defendants*
negligence because he could not, as a matter of law, have recovered
from Zions.

Zions' actions were protected by Utah statute.

Wilford Youd's request to reissue the Certificates in his name and
those of his daughters was proper and the bank's decision to honor
that request may not subject it to claims by plaintiff.

Plaintiff

did not present the Certificates of Deposit for present payment,
and so Plaintiff's claims of dishonored presentment or breach of
contract are not applicable.

Similarly, plaintiff's attempt to

manufacture a genuine issue of material fact fails.

If the

testimony upon which plaintiff relies is determined to actually
apply to the Certificates of Deposit involved in this case, then
plaintiff does not have a claim, since Zions followed his
instructions.

If the testimony does not refer to these

Certificates or is not accurate, then the bank's actions were
protected by statute.
Zions.

Either way, plaintiff cannot recover against

There is no genuine issue of material fact when either

resolution of the issue will end up with the same outcome.
Plaintiff was unable to obtain the funds from the
Certificates of Deposit purchased by his father.

Zions, however,

acted properly and is not subject to liability to plaintiff,
-22-

because the trial court was correct in determining that Zions was
protected by Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-112 in its determination to
reissue the Certificates as requested by Wilford Youd.

Therefore,

plaintiff was barred from recovering against Zions and accordingly
suffered no damages in this case.

Summary judgment in favor of the

defendant is proper and the district court's decision should be
affirmed.
DATED this

^

day of October, 1988.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Thomas L. ^Cay
Steven J. Aeschbacher
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
2825a
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the ^> ^* day of October, 1988,
four true and correct copies of Brief of Respondents was mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Roy G. Haslam
Elizabeth S. Whitney
BEHLE, HASLAM & HATCH
50 W. Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Appellant

2825a
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and, if the custodian is removed, shall so require and order delivery of
all custodial property to the successor custodian and the execution of
all instruments required for the transfer thereof.
History: C. 1953, 75-5-608, enacted by
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 6.

75-5-609. Construction of this part.— (1) This part shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of
those states which have enacted the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.
(2) This part shall not be construed as providing an exclusive method for making gifts to minors.
History: C. 1953, 75-5-609, enacted by
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 6.

CHAPTER 6
NONPROBATE TRANSFERS
Part L Multiple-Party Accounts
Section
75-6-101. Definitions.
75-6-102. Ownership as between parties, and others—Protection of financial institutions.
75-6-103. Ownership during lifetime.
75-6-104. Right of survivorship.
75-6-105. Effect of written notice to financial institution.
75-6-106. Accounts and transfers nontestamentary.
75-6-107. Rights of creditors.
75-6-108. Financial institution protection—Payment on signature of one party.
75-6-109. Financial institution protection—Payment after death or disability—
Joint account
75-6-110. Financial institution protection—Payment of P.O.D. account.
76-6-111. Financial institution protection—Payment of trust account.
75-6-112. Financial institution protection—Discharge.
75-6-113. Financial institution protection—Setoff—Attachment, garnishment, and
other legal process.
75-6-114. Financial institution protection—Costs and attorneys' fees.
75-6-115. Agency accounts.
Part 2. Provisions Relating to Effect on Death
75-6-201. Provisions for payment or transfer at death.

Parti
Multiple-Party Accounts
75-6-101. Definitions.—As used in this part:
(1) "Account" means a contract of deposit of funds between a depositor and a financial institution and includes a checking account, savings account, certificate of deposit, share account, and other like arrangement.
(2) "Beneficiary" means a person named in a trust account as one
for whom a party to the account is named as trustee.
289

75-6-101

NONPROBATE TRANSFERS

(3) "Financial institution" means any organization authorized to do
business under state or federal laws relating to financial institutions, including, without limitation, banks and trust companies, industrial loan
corporations with thrift certificate authorization, savings banks, building and loan associations, savings and loan companies or associations,
and credit unions.
(4) "Joint account" means an account payable on request to one or
more of two or more parties whether or not mention is made of any right
of survivorship.
(5) "Multiple-party account" means any of the following types of
account: (a) A joint account; (b) A P.O.D. account; or (c) A trust
account. It does not include accounts established for deposit of funds of a
partnership, joint venture, or other association for business purposes, or
accounts controlled by one or more persons as the duly authorized agent
or trustee for a corporation, unincorporated association, charitable or
civic organization, or a regular fiduciary or trust account where the relationship is established other than by deposit agreement.
(6) "Net contribution" of a party to a joint account as of any given
time is the sum of all deposits to it made by or for him, less all withdrawals made by or for him wrhich have not been paid to or applied to
the use of any other party, plus a prorata share of any interest or dividends included in the current balance. The term includes, in addition,
any proceeds of deposit life insurance added to the account by reason of
the death of the party whose net contribution is in question.
(7) "Party" means a person, including a minor, who, by the terms
of the account, has a present right, subject to request, to payment from
a multiple-party account. A P.O.D. payee or beneficiary of a trust account is a party only after the account becomes payable to him by
reason of his surviving the original payee or trustee and includes a
guardian, conservator, personal representative, or assignee, including an
attaching creditor, of a party. It also includes a person identified as a
trustee of an account for another whether or not a beneficiary is named,
but it does not include any named beneficiary unless he has a present
right of withdrawal.
(8) 'Tayment" of sums on deposit includes withdrawal, payment on
check or other directive of a party, and any pledge of sums on deposit
by a party and any setoff, reduction, or other disposition of all or part
of an account pursuant to a pledge.
(9) "Proof of death" includes a death certificate or record or report
which is prima facie proof of death under section 75-1-107,
(10) "P.O.D. account" means an account payable on request to one
person during lifetime and on his death to one or more P.O.D. payees,
or to one or more persons during their lifetimes and on the death of all
of them to one or more P.O.D. payees.
(11) "P.O J), payee" means a person designated on a P.O.D. account
as one to whom the account is payable on request after the death of one
or more persons.
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(12) "Request" means a proper request for withdrawal, or a check
or order for pajinent, which complies with all conditions of the account,
including special requirements concerning necessary signatures and
regulations of the financial institution; but if the financial institution
conditions withdrawal or payment on advance notice, for purposes of
this part the request for withdrawal or payment is treated as immediately effective and a notice of intent to withdraw is treated as a request
for withdrawal.
(13) "Sums on deposit" means the balance payable on a multipleparty account, including interest, dividends, and in addition any deposit
life insurance proceeds added to the account by reason of the death of
a party.
(14) "Trust account" means an account in the name of one or more
parties as trustee for one or more beneficiaries where the relationship
is established by the form of the account and the deposit agreement with
the financial institution and there is no subject of the trust other than
the sums on deposit in the account; and it is not essential that payment
to the beneficiary be mentioned in the deposit agreement. A trust account does not include a regular trust account under a testamentary
trust or a trust agreement which has significance apart from the account, or a fiduciary account arising from a fiduciary relation such as
attorney-client.
(15) "Withdrawal" includes payment to a third person pursuant to
check or other directive of a party.
History: C. 1953, 75-6-101, enacted by
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7.
Editorial Board Comment,
This and the sections which follow are
designed to reduce certain questions concerning many forms of joint accounts
and the so-called Totten Trust account.
An account "payable on death" is also
authorized.
As may be seen from examination
of the sections that follow, "net contribution" as defined by subsection (6)
has no application to the financial institution-depositor relationship. Rather, it
is relevant only to controversies that
may arise between parties to a multipleparty account.
Various signature requirements may
be involved in order to meet the withdrawal requirements of the account. A
"request" involves compliance with these
requirements. A "party" is one to whom
an account is presently payable without
regard for whose signature may be required for a "request."
Cross-References.
Bank deposits in name of fiduciary or
principal, 22-1-7 to 22-1-11.

Collateral References.
Banks and Bankinge=>129, 134, 138,
142, 143, 301, 315 (3); Joint TenancyC=>3,
6, 10, 14; TrustsO=>34.
9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking §§286,
296-308, 334, 353, 994, 998, 1003, 1057; 48
C.J.S. Joint Tenancy §§3, 6, 13, 18; 89
CJ.S. Trusts § 54.
10 Am. Jur. 2d 330 et seq., Banks
§ 369 et seq.
Attachment: joint bank account as
subject to attachment, garnishment, or
execution by creditor of one of the joint
depositors, 11 A. L. R. 3d 1465.
Bank's right to apply or set off deposit against debt of depositor not due at
time of his death, 7 A. L. R. 3d 908.
Bank's right to apply third person's
funds, deposited in debtor's name, on
debtor's obligation, 8 A. L. R. 3d 235.
Death of beneficiary as terminating or
revoking trust of savings bank account
over which settlor retains rights of withdrawal or revocation, 64 A. L. R. 3d 221.
Fingerprints as signature on instrument purporting to create joint tenancy,
72 A. L. R. 2d 1268.
Gift to survivor, creation of joint savings account or savings certificate as, 43
A. L. R. 3d 971.
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written agreement or contract by showing that because of fraud, duress, undue
influence, mistake, incapacity or other
infirmity that in equity and good conscience it should not be enforced; because

of the verity accorded written instruments, its effect can be overcome only
by clear and convincing evidence. Pagano
v. Walker, 539 P. 2d 452 (4-1 decision),

75-6-102. Ownership as between parties, and others—Protection of
financial institutions.—The provisions of sections 75-6-103 through 75-6105 concerning beneficial ownership as between parties, or as between
parties and P.O.D. payees or beneficiaries of multiple-party accounts, are
relevant only to controversies between these persons and their creditors
and other successors, and have no bearing on the power of withdrawal of
these persons as determined by the terms of account contracts. The
provisions of sections 75-6-108 through 75-6-113 govern the liability of
financial institutions who make payments pursuant thereto, and their
setoff rights.
History: C. 1953, 75-6-102, enacted by
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7.
i?.r*
T>
^
Editorial Board Comment.
This section organizes the sections
which follow into those dealing with the
relationship between parties to multipleparty accounts, on the one hand, and
those relating to the financial institutiondepositor (or party) relationship, on the
other. By keeping these relationships
separate, it is possible to achieve the
degree of definiteness that financial institutions must have in order to be induced
to offer multiple-party accounts for use
by their customers, while preserving the

opportunity for individuals involved in
multiple-party accounts to show various
intentions that may have attended the
original deposit, or any unusual transactions affecting the account thereafter,
The separation thus permits individuals
using accounts of the type dealt with by
these sections to avoid unconsidered and
unwanted definiteness in regard to their
relationship with each other. In a sense,
the approach is to implement a layman's
wish to "trust" a co-depositor by leaving
questions that may arise between them
essentially unaffected by the form of the
account,

75-6-103. Ownership during lifetime.—(1) A joint account belongs,
during the lifetime of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net
contributions by each to the sums on deposit, unless there is clear and
convincing evidence of a different intent.
(2) A P.O.D. account belongs to the original payee during his lifetime and not to the P.O.D. payee or payees; if two or more parties are
named as original payees, during their lifetimes rights as between them
are governed by subsection (1) of this section.
(3) Unless a contrary intent is manifested by the terms of the account or the deposit agreement or there is other clear and convincing
evidence of an irrevocable trust, a trust account belongs beneficially to
the trustee during his lifetime, and if two or more parties are named as
trustee on the account, during their lifetimes beneficial rights as between
them are governed by subsection (1) of this section. If there is an irrevocable trust, the account belongs beneficially to the beneficiary.
History: C. 1953, 75-6-103, enacted by
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7.
__
.
Editonal Board Comment.
. This section reflects the assumption
that a person who deposits funds in a

multiple-party account normally does
not intend to make an irrevocable gift
of all or any part of the funds represented by the deposit. Bather, he usually
intends no present change of beneficial
ownership. The assumption may be dis-
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written demand by a surviving spouse, a creditor, or one acting for a
minor or dependent child of the decedent; and no proceeding shall be
commenced later than two years following the death of the decedent.
Sums recovered by the personal representative shall be administered as
part of the decedent's estate. This section shall not affect the right of a
financial institution to make payment on multiple-party accounts according to the terms thereof or make it liable to the estate of a deceased
party unless before payment the institution has been served with process
in a proceeding by the personal representative.
History. C. 1953, 75-6-107, enacted by
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7.
-CU- • T> J ^
Editorial Board Comment.
The sections of this chapter authorize
transfers a t death which reduce the
estate to which the surviving spouse,
creditors and minor children normally
must look for protection against a decedent's gifts by will. Accordingly, it
seemed desirable to provide a remedy to
these classes of persons which should
assure them that multiple-party accounts
cannot be used to reduce the essential
protection they would be entitled to if
such accounts were deemed a special
form of specific devise. Under this section a surviving spouse is automatically
assured of some protection against a

multiple-party account if the probate
estate is insolvent; rights are limited,
however, to sums needed for statutorv
allowances. The phrase "statutory allowances" includes the homestead allowance under section 75-2-401, the
family allowance under section 75-2-403,
and any allowance needed to make up
the deficiency in exempt property under
section 75-2-402. In any case (including
a solvent estate) the surviving spouse
could proceed under section 75-2-201 et
seq. to claim an elective share in the
account if the deposits by the decedent
satisfy the requirements of section 752-202 so that the account falls within the
augmented net estate concept. In the
latter situation the spouse is not proceeding as a creditor under this section.

75-6-108. Financial institution protection—Payment on signature of
one party.—Financial institutions may enter into multiple-party accounts to the same extent that they may enter into single-party accounts.
Any multiple-party account may be paid, on request, to any one or more
of the parties. A financial institution shall not be required to inquire
as to the source of funds received for deposit to a multiple-party account, or to inquire as to the proposed application of any sum withdrawn
from an account, for purposes of establishing net contributions.
History: C. 1953, 75-6-108, enacted by
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7.

75-6-109. Financial institution protection—Payment after death or
disability—Joint account.—Any sums in a joint account may be paid, on
request, to. any party without regard to whether any other party is incapacitated or deceased at the time the payment is demanded; but
payment may not be made to the personal representative or heirs of a deceased party unless proofs of death are presented to the financial institution showing that the decedent was the last surviving party or unless
there is no right of survivorship under section 75-6-104.
History: C. 1953, 75-6-109, enacted by
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7.

75-6-110. Financial institution protection—Payment of P.O.D. account.—Any P.O.D. account may be paid, on request, to any original
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party to the account. Payment may be made, on request, to the P.O.D.
payee or to the personal representative or heirs of a deceased P.O.D.
payee upon presentation to the financial institution of proof of death
showing that the P.O.D. payee survived all persons named as original
payees. Payment may be made to the personal representative or heirs
of a deceased original payee if proof of death is presented to the financial institution showing that his decedent was the survivor of all other
persons named on the account either as an original payee or as P.O.D.
payee.
History: C. 1953, 75-6-110, enacted by
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7.

75-6-111. Financial institution protection—Payment of trust account.
—Any trust account may be paid, on request, to any trustee. Unless the
financial institution has received written notice that the beneficiary has
a vested interest not dependent upon his surviving the trustee, payment
may be made to the personal representative or heirs of a deceased trustee
if proof of death is presented to the financial institution showing that his
decedent was the survivor of all other persons named on the account
either as trustee or beneficiary. Payment may be made, on request, to
the beneficiary upon presentation to the financial institution of proof of
death showing that the beneficiary or beneficiaries survived all persons
named as trustees.
History: C. 1953, 75-6-111, enacted by
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7.

75-6-112. Financial institution protection — Discharge. — Payment
made pursuant to section 75-6-108, 75-6-109, 75-6-110 or 75-6-111 discharges the financial institution from all claims for amounts so paid
whether or not the payment is consistent with the beneficial ownership
of the account as between parties, P.O.D. payees, or beneficiaries, or
their successors. The protection here given does not extend to payments made after a financial institution has received written notice
from any party able to request present payment to the effect that withdrawals in accordance with the terms of the account should not be
permitted. Unless the notice is withdrawn by the person giving it, the
successor of any deceased party must concur in any demand for withdrawal if the financial institution is to be protected under this section.
No other notice or any other information shown to have been available
to a financial institution shall affect its right to the protection provided
here. The protection here provided shall have no bearing on the rights
of parties in disputes between themselves or their successors concerning the beneficial ownership of funds in, or withdrawn from, multipleparty accounts.
History: C. 1953, 75-6-112, enacted by
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7.

75-6-113. Financial institution protection—Setoff—Attachment, garnishment, and other legal process.—(1) Without qualifying any other
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT POR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
* * *

GARTH YOUD,
Civil No. C83-1368W

Plaintiff,
vs.

Deposition of:

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,

DONA JENSEN

Defendant.
* * *

Deposition of DONA JENSEN, taken at the instance
and request of the Plaintiff, at the law offices of Howard,
Lewis & Petersen, 120 East 300 North, Provo, Utah, on the 16th
day of May, 1984, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., before LANETTE
SHINDURLING, a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Utah License No.
122, and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah.

* * *

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 322-3441
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Warner at the bank?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you remember talking to her on that occasion?

A

Not definitely.

Q

Do you know who she talked with?

A

Not for sure.

Q

And you don't remember anything that took place at

that time?
A

(Indicating negatively.)

Q

Were you ever advised by Mr. Roach that he had

talked with Mr. Wilford Youd?
A

Yes.

Q

And when were you so advised?

A

After he talked to him.

Q

When was that?

A

Then, I guess.
MR. PRATT:

What's your best memory of when that

would have been?
THE WITNESS:

The same time —

within the same time

frame that Garth Youd had been in and cashed certificates.
Q

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

Before or after?

A

After that.

Q

And how did that conversation come about?

A

I don't know for sure.

Q

But he approached you and told you about the
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conversation?
A

Only — yes.

Q

What did he say?

A

Well, just simply that there had been a problem come

up about certificates and where I had helped them, Garth, with
a couple of them,
Q

What did he say specifically to you?

A

I don't know for sure.

Q

Well, he said there had been a problem that came up.

Did he tell you what the problem was?
A

Only some family —

just there was a problem with

the way we were handling the certificates.
Q

Did he give you instruction?

A

He could have.

Q

Well, did you do anything relative to the time

certificates of deposit you testified that you reissued to Mr.
Garth Youd?
MR. PRATT:

If you can recall.

MR. JOHNSON:

Counsel —

THE WITNESS:

Once those certificates had been

reissued to Mr. Youd, that was over with and done.
Q

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

That's what I'm asking you. After

he says something vague to you about "There's been a problem
with the Youd time certificates", doesn't he say anything more
to you about that?
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A

There were apparently other certificates.

Q

So did he give you instruction as it related to the

other certificates?
A

Not that I remember.

Q

Well, did he say, "Don't cash anymore", or, "Talk to

me", or "Go back and do something with these certificates
you've issued", anything like that?
MR. PRATT:

Objection as to form.

She's already

said she doesnft remember.
Q

(BY MR. JOHNSON)
MR. PRATT:

You can if you can answer it.

THE WITNESS:
Q

Go ahead and answer the question.

What was the question again?

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

The question was: After he told

you about the vague problem, that there was some problem among
the family, as I understand your testimony, did he tell you
with regard to the other certificates not to cash them, to
talk to him, or did he tell you to go back and do something
with the time certificates of deposit you had apparently
issued to Mr. Youd?
MR. PRATT:

Object as to form.

She's already said

she doesn't remember.
Q

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

Go ahead.

A

Probably to talk to him before anything was done.

Q

But you were not asked to go back and do anything

with regard to what had already taken place?

